



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your copy. Attached
are copies for NFAC
& DDO.

TKS




P.S. This is the
missing document mentioned
in the dated memo. Date _____
ccs to DDO
NFAC

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 2, 1979

Ref SC 05702

C C I E R S T O :

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Improvements in the Quality and Relevance of
Political Analysis

The Department believes that there are four areas where efforts can and should be made to improve the quality and relevance of political analysis over the coming months:

(1) Quality Control: A political intelligence review is in process for eight key countries where our interests would be seriously affected by unexpected changes in the political environment. All our diplomatic missions are working in association with the geographic bureaus to prepare political reporting schedules for the next six months. Through this process, we expect to have much tighter control over both the relevance and quality of field reporting as well as a clearer sense of the need for (a) strengthening and augmenting of political reporting officers and analysts in the Department and overseas, (b) providing TDY assistance to posts for special reporting requirements and (c) calling on outside scholars or advisors for supplementing information or for assistance in conducting independent field surveys.

(2) Resource Availability: Over the last few years there has been a steady decline in the number of political reporting officers in the Foreign Service, the number of analysts in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the funds available for local travel by political officers and analysts abroad. At the same time, the requirements we have placed on our missions for non-political reporting and analysis tasks have mounted steadily. It will not be possible to increase both long-term and in-depth reporting and analysis without expanding the resources available. We will look closely at our ability to re-program within present resources but it may be necessary to look at the requirements for additional resources as well.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY
FILE # L-299

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(3) Long-Term/Short-Term Intelligence Balance: Our present balance in basic intelligence reporting and analysis as opposed to immediately relevant policy reporting and analysis began to take shape early in the 1960s. At that time policy relevance began to take increasing precedence over fundamental research. The rationale was that the academic world could study the longer-term issues and provide from outside a data base for the policy analysts and reporting officers in the Department and elsewhere in the Government. This approach has worked reasonably well. At the same time, there has been a steady thinning out of our information base within the Government. Academic scholarship has not always focused on those issues we are interested in at critical times, nor is the quality of academic scholars even. Research on a particularly important subject may, therefore, either not have been done at all or done poorly. We need to review on an intelligence community-wide basis whether our analysts have the experience, training, and continuity of involvement on major countries and issues to provide the intelligence and analytic foundation necessary for both short term and longer term analysis. We will also be reviewing what further emphasis on basic political, sociological, cultural, and economic background information is necessary, not only for our longer-term intelligence base, but so we are able to assess the reasons for political and social turbulence when it occurs and make sounder judgments on where it may lead and what we might do about it. We will address this issue in reviewing our Embassies' six month reporting programs described in (1) above.

(4) Completeness of Information: We have for many years, in many countries, and for many reasons, permitted our Missions to restrict the collection of intelligence information from certain sensitive sectors of the local political environment. The basic rationale for this has been a desire to avoid jeopardizing relations with Governments in power by meeting with individuals or groups opposing the governments. Usually these restrictions have been concurred in by responsible policy-level officers of the Department and elsewhere in the Government and often they have been necessary. We should focus our attention more sharply, however, on the costs and benefits of such

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self-imposed constraints and ensure that wherever they exist or may in future be proposed, senior policy attention is devoted to considering whether they should be continued or not. The absence of reliable information on the views, attitudes, and policies of major political segments of the population of key countries can under some circumstances pose major problems for U.S. policy analysis and intelligence evaluation. We intend to conduct a review of such restraints in the next month for all our missions.

Peter Tarnoff
Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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